Participants experiencing positive or negative affect judged products described by brand and attribute information. Four studies using parameter-estimation and reaction-time procedures determined whether the impact of affect on brand name was the result of its influence on (a) participants' perception of its evaluative implications at the time of encoding or (b) the importance they attached to it while integrating it with other information to compute a judgment. Results showed that positive affect increased the extremity of the brand's evaluative implications (i.e., its scale value) rather than the importance (or weight) that participants attached to it. A fifth experiment demonstrated the implications of these findings for product choices made 24 hours after affect was induced.
R esearch on the role of brand name in product evaluations has been extensive and has addressed a variety of issues, including how brand associations are learned (van Osselaer and Alba 2000; van Osselaer and Janiszewski 2001) , its use in relation to other available cues (Maheswaran, Mackie, and Chaiken 1992) , and its influence on future brand extensions (Aaker and Keller 1990; Bousch and Loken 1991) . Much of this research has shown that the impact of brand name tends to override the effects of other information either because it is used as a heuristic (Maheswaran et al. 1992) or because its presence inhibits the learning of other attribute information (van Osselaer and Alba 2000) . Some researchers have speculated that brand name plays a dominant role in product decisions because it is a high scope cue that has implications for a wide variety of attributes (Purohit and Srivastava 2001) . Consequently, it may often be seen as a sufficient basis for judgments. It is therefore not surprising that companies spend millions of dollars to build brand equity in myriad ways. Despite this investment, however, perceptions of known brands appear to be relatively stable and resistant to change.
Research in some areas of consumer behavior suggests that this might not always be true. Numerous studies have demonstrated that consumers' evaluations of a product are often influenced by the affect they happen to be experiencing at the time (Adaval 2001; Barone, Miniard, and Romeo 2000; Pham 1998; Shiv and Fedorikhin 1999) . For example, affect can either influence the relative importance that is given to different product attributes (Adaval 2001) or have a direct effect on product evaluations independently of the information available (Pham 1998) . However, little of this research has examined the way in which people's affective reactions can influence perceptions of brand name per se. If affective reactions have an impact on how brands are perceived, this provides a potentially viable avenue for influencing brand equity.
In conceptualizing the impact of affect on reactions to brand name, it is important to distinguish its influence at two different stages of processing. When consumers receive information about a product, they may first subjectively assess the favorableness of each piece of information. Then, they may integrate these estimates to arrive at an overall judgment of the product. The impact of affect on the influence of brand name could be localized in either or both of these stages. For example, it could influence the weight (or importance) that consumers attach to brand name when they combine its implications with that of other available information to compute an overall judgment. However, it could also influence consumers' perceptions of the favorableness of brand name at the time this information is first received and interpreted.
It is of both theoretical and practical importance to distinguish between these effects. Evidence that affect can in-fluence brand perceptions would not only contradict the assumption that these perceptions are stable but would suggest a hitherto unidentified means of improving brand equity. The different ways in which affect might influence reactions to brand name could also have implications for the persistence of these responses over time. Its influence on the weight attached to brand name at the time of judgment is likely to be transitory and may depend on particulars of the judgment situation (e.g., the amount and importance of other information available). On the other hand, if affect influences consumers' estimates of the favorableness of brand name (i.e., its interpretation) and this estimate is stored in memory, it might be recalled and used as a basis for judgments that consumers make later, after the affect itself has dissipated. These issues were examined in the five experiments to be reported.
THE IMPACT OF AFFECT ON BRAND NAMES: COGNITIVE MECHANISMS
Brand as a Knowledge Structure Keller (1998) suggests that brand names can be represented in memory as an associative network composed of (a) a central concept denoting the brand and (b) a number of specific features that have become associated with the concept through learning. The activation of this concept in memory may trigger a number of associations that could consist of product experiences, images, specific attribute information, and so on. Thus, the name "Pringles," for example, could bring to mind an image of the vertical container, curved chips, a prior experience of having had them as a snack, the quality of the chips, and so on. In contrast, when consumers encounter specific attribute information (e.g., 50 calories per serving, $2.99), it may elicit relatively few associations. This difference between brand names and specific attributes is also reflected in the conception of them as high and low scope cues, respectively (Purohit and Srivastava 2001) .
When brand and attribute information are presented together, the influence of brand name is likely to predominate. For example, van Osselaer and Alba (2000) suggest that, once the relationship between brands and quality is learned, it can inhibit the examination of the quality implications of specific attributes (but see van Osselaer and Janiszewski 2001 for contingencies). In a quite different research paradigm, Maheswaran et al. (1992) showed that, when people are unmotivated to think extensively about product information, they appear to use brand name as a heuristic basis for judgment rather than consider the specific attribute information that accompanies it. In combination, these findings suggest that people often consider brand name to have implications for a wide range of features and, therefore, rely on it extensively.
The Influence of Affect on the Impact of Brand Name
The affect that consumers experience may influence the extent to which they use brand names as a basis for judgments. Previous research suggests that the affect people are experiencing at the time they receive information activates well-learned strategies for processing this information (Bless 2000) . Positive affect is typically associated with benign, nonproblematic situations (Frijda 1988; Schwarz and Bless 1991) . In such situations, people may rely on preexisting general knowledge structures that are potentially applicable to the situation at hand rather than details of the situation. There are two reasons for this. First, reliance on these structures could serve an adaptive function because it permits fewer resources to be allocated to nonproblematic situations. Second, general knowledge structures provide a richer stimulus base that can be used to make inferences that go beyond the information at hand (Bless et al. 1996) . Thus, once an association between an affective state and a processing strategy is formed, new situations in which these feelings are experienced may spontaneously activate this strategy and lead it to be applied with little cognitive deliberation (Wyer, Clore, and Isbell 1999) . In contrast, negative affect is associated with unpleasant experiences that require vigilance in order to minimize adversity. Therefore, the experience of this affect is likely to stimulate a learned disposition to focus on details of a situation or the data at hand. Bless et al. (1996) provide support for this possibility. Happy participants who listened to a tape-recorded story while performing a clerical task were more likely than unhappy participants to use a prototypic script to interpret the taped event sequence. Thus, happy participants used relatively broader concepts to encode the events that were shown. At the same time, however, they performed better on the clerical task than unhappy participants did. This latter finding argues against the general hypothesis that positive affect decreases the motivation to engage in extensive information processing. Rather, it activates a more general disposition to pay attention to general knowledge structures for judgment.
Thus to the extent that brand names exemplify such general knowledge structures (Keller 1998) , positive affect is likely to increase the extent to which they are relied upon in making judgments. As noted earlier, this reliance could be of two types. Specifically, positive affect could influence one's perception of a brand's evaluative implications at the time of information input. However, it could also influence the weight that is attached to brand name at the time it is integrated with other available information to make a judgment (i.e., at the time of output).
Changes at Input: Interpretation of Information. The interpretation of information about a target involves an understanding of both its denotative (or descriptive) meaning and its connotative (or evaluative) meaning. Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) and Srull and Wyer (1980) showed that participants often interpret ambiguous information in terms of semantic concepts that are activated in memory. Thus, a behavior can be interpreted as adventurous or foolhardy depending on the descriptive concepts applied. If the affect people experience influences the concepts that are accessible in memory at the time information is received (Bower 1981) , it could influence the concepts that are used to interpret it. However, research by Niedenthal and Setterlund (1994) shows that affect has little impact on the accessibility of semantic concepts in memory. If this is true, it appears unlikely that affect will influence the descriptive meaning that is assigned to information.
However, affect could influence the connotative (or evaluative) meaning of information. This could occur when people know that their reaction to a particular stimulus is favorable or unfavorable but they are uncertain of how favorable or unfavorable it is. Research on the use of affect as information (Pham 1998; Schwarz and Clore 1996) suggests that people often attribute the feelings they happen to be experiencing to the stimulus they are asked to evaluate and, therefore, use these feelings as a basis for judgment, judging it more favorably when they are happy. Although the use of affect as information is typically assumed to occur at the time of judgment, it could also occur at the time individual pieces of information are first received and interpreted (Isbell and Wyer 1996) . In the present context, for example, people might use the affect they are experiencing as information about their reactions to a brand and may interpret it as more favorable when they are feeling happy than when they are not.
If positive affect stimulates people to use general knowledge structures, however, a quite different possibility arises. As noted earlier, brand names are associated with a number of features. These features are likely to be similar in favorableness and collectively have implications for the overall brand attitude. When people encounter a brand, a number of its associated features may spontaneously come to mind. However, individuals are more likely to think about and elaborate the implications of these features if they are happy than if they are not (Bless et al. 1996) . Fiedler (1990) argued that positive mood stimulates people to go beyond the information that is given and to make inferences based on previously acquired knowledge. Thus, for example, people who encounter the brand name "Levi's" might normally evaluate it on the basis of a few features that come to mind quickly when they think of this brand. If they are in a positive mood, however, they might activate a more general body of knowledge about Levi's that leads them not only to consider a greater number of associated features but also to elaborate the implications of each of these associations in terms of their past experiences. This elaboration may increase the extremity of their evaluation of the brand as a whole. (For evidence that positive affect increases the tendency to engage in relational elaboration, see Lee and Sternthal 1999; see also Isen 2001) .
In this regard, Tesser (1978) found that, when people thought more extensively about a stimulus they had encountered earlier, it increased the extremity of their evaluations of it. That is, they rated moderately favorable stimuli more favorably and moderately unfavorable stimuli more unfavorably than they had earlier. In the present context, this suggests that people who experience positive affect are more likely to elaborate the implications of brand name leading them to perceive favorable brands as more favorable and unfavorable ones as more unfavorable, than people who experience negative affect. In contrast, affect should not normally influence the tendency to elaborate the implications of specific attributes (e.g., $35) with which relatively few features are associated. In other words, people may interpret attribute information similarly regardless of the affect they experience.
Changes at Output: Weighting of Information. The reliance on general knowledge structures could potentially influence processing at the time of judgment, as well as when the information is received and comprehended. For example, people who experience positive affect are more inclined to base their judgments on stereotypes without considering informational details (Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Suesser 1994) . A similar effect could occur in evaluating products. That is, the general tendency for happy people to rely on general knowledge structures could lead them to weight brand information more heavily in the course of integrating its implications with those of other information at the time of judgment.
This tendency could conceivably reflect a more general disposition for happy individuals to rely on heuristic bases for judgments. However, several studies call this possibility into question. For one thing, people who consider a task to be enjoyable may often engage in more extensive processing of information when they feel happy than when they do not (Isen 1987 (Isen , 2001 Martin et al. 1993; Wegener, Petty, and Smith 1995) . Bless et al.'s (1996) findings, noted earlier, also argue against the hypothesis that positive affect induces a general tendency to avoid complex information processing. Nonetheless, the possibility that affect might influence the weight attached to brand name in some situations is worth exploring.
Localizing the Influence of Affect
The different influences of positive affect on the interpretation of brand name and the weight that people attach to it at the time of judgment cannot be inferred from the magnitude of its effects on judgments per se. That is, suppose brand name has a greater effect on product evaluations when people experience positive affect than when they do not. This could be due to the greater weight that people attach to brand name relative to other information at the time they compute their judgments or to the fact that its evaluative implications are interpreted differently at the time the information is first received, or to a combination of these effects. However, the two effects can be distinguished more clearly in terms of a model of information integration proposed by Anderson (1971) . According to this conceptualization, the evaluation of a stimulus on the basis of several pieces of information is a weighted average of the evaluative implications of each piece considered separately. Specifically, the evaluation of a product J is represented as
where w i and S i are the absolute weight and scale value of the ith piece of information and w 0 and S 0 are the absolute weight and scale value of an "initial impression" that is formed before the information is received. Therefore, the evaluation of a product J based on a brand b and a specific attribute a would be expressed as
where S 0 , S b , and S a refer to the scale values (i.e., evaluative implications) of the initial impression that people form of a product, its brand name, and attribute information, respectively, along the dimension of judgment and w 0 , w b , and w a are the absolute weights attached to these pieces of information, respectively. The influence of a situational variable on the interpretation of information and on the importance given to it at the time of judgment can be localized in terms of the effects of the variable on scale value (i.e., S b and S a ) and weight (i.e., w b and w a ), respectively. Birnbaum and Stegner (1979) , for example, examined the effects of source credibility on participants' judgments and showed that the effects of a source's expertise were localized in the weight attached to the information (or the importance given to it), while the effects of a source's bias were localized in the scale value (or interpretation) of the information. In a quite different domain, Abele and Petzold (1994) found that the influence of positive affect on evaluations of persons was localized in the scale value of the initial impression (S 0 ). In the present context, the influence of positive affect on the weight attached to brand name at the point of integration should be reflected in the weight parameter, w b , whereas its effect on the interpretation of the brand information should be reflected in its scale value, S b .
Note that the weighted average model suggests that changes in the interpretation of a piece of information are independent of what is presented with it. This can be seen from equation 2, where the second component of this equation is the only one that contains S b . If affect increases this parameter, it should increase the impact of brand name but should not influence the impact of attribute information (reflected in the third component of the equation). However, suppose affect increases the absolute weight attached to brand, w b . This parameter is in not only the second component of the equation but also the denominator of the third component. Thus, an increase in the value of this parameter should not only increase the impact of brand name but should also decrease the relative weight attached to attribute information and, therefore, should decrease the influence of this information on judgments.
The applicability of equation 2 to judgment phenomena should not be overgeneralized (see Wyer and Carlston 1979 for a discussion of contingencies in its validity). However, several studies (Hagerty 1978; Levin and Johnson 1984; Troutman and Shanteau 1976; Yamagishi and Hill 1981) suggest that the model provides a good description of the processes that underlie judgments. Its applicability in the present research was evaluated using a parameter-estimation procedure developed by Zalinski and Anderson (1990) to be described presently.
EXPERIMENT 1

Overview and Design
Forty-four undergraduate students were induced to feel either happy or sad by asking them to watch and evaluate an uplifting or depressing movie. After doing so, they evaluated products from one product category (jeans) on the basis of brand name, an attribute, or both. The design consisted of one between-subjects variable (affect: happy vs. sad) and two within-subject variables (brand name: favorable vs. unfavorable; and attribute information: favorable vs. unfavorable).
Procedure
Participants were told that several university departments were collaborating in developing a profile of student life. This profile included information on such topics as courses they were enrolled in, experiences in their daily life, the kind of entertainment they liked, the products they typically purchased, and so on. They were forewarned that, because of the length of the survey, they would be asked questions on only a subset of these topics. This preamble provided an excuse for administering the affect-induction procedure, the product-evaluation task, and the manipulation-check questionnaires in a way that would decrease conjectures as to why they were administered and allowed them to be disguised as coming from different departments (e.g., psychology, marketing, student affairs office). This cover story gave the impression that the individual questionnaires were unrelated in any meaningful way.
Manipulation of Affect. Participants were told that the first part of the study was for a specific university department that was interested in determining the sorts of films that students enjoyed. Under this pretext, students were asked to watch clips from three movies (Martin et al. 1993) . Film segments from Pretty Woman and Mrs. Doubtfire were used to induce a happy mood and segments from Ordinary People and Sophie's Choice were used to depress participants' mood. Both happy and sad films were preceded by an evaluatively neutral segment from Bullitt to draw attention away from the overall emotional tone of the films. Participants were asked a few questions after they watched each film clip (e.g., whether they enjoyed films of the sort being shown, whether they had seen the film before, whether they could identify the actors in the film).
Product Evaluations. After performing the affectinduction task, participants were given a second task, ostensibly from the department of marketing, in which they evaluated eight pairs of basic blue jeans, each based on a different set of information. The first four products were described by a single piece of information pertaining to either brand name ("Levi's" vs. "Rustler") or attribute information ("jeans have been preshrunk" vs. "jeans have not been preshrunk").
1 The next four products were described by brand name and attribute information in combination (e.g., "Levi's; jeans have been preshrunk"). Within each set of four products (i.e., those described by a single piece of information and those described by brand and attribute information in combination), presentation order was counterbalanced so that the mean serial position of each product description was the same. (Thus, if some participants evaluated a product "Levi's: jeans have been preshrunk" first, others evaluated it last.) Further, to ensure that the evaluative implications of the brand and attribute information were understood, a line was added to clarify these implications. Specifically, brand name was followed by the statement "ranked first (ninth) out of ten different brands of jeans surveyed-most (least) popular brand". Similarly, the attribute information was followed by the statements "Preshrunk jeans have tighter stitches and better durability. They also feel soft against the skin." Participants rated each product along two Ϫ5 to +5 scales pertaining to liking (dislike extremely vs. like extremely and extremely bad product vs. extremely good product).
Manipulation Checks. After completing their product evaluations, participants were told that the student affairs office was interested in monitoring how they felt on a dayto-day basis and wanted a questionnaire administered at different points in the day. Under this pretext, they were asked to report how they felt at that moment (specifically, "How happy do you feel right now?" and "How would you rate your mood at this moment?") along scales from Ϫ5 (extremely unhappy/bad) to +5 (extremely happy/good). These responses (r p .91) were averaged to provide a single index of the affect that participants were experiencing at the end of the experiment and to determine if the affect had persisted through the duration of the experiment. Note that no reference was made to the mood-induction procedure at this point, ensuring that participants' attention was not drawn to their feelings and no demand was imposed on them 1 The two brands were selected on the basis of focus group discussions and pretest data that indicated that they differed substantially in favorableness (M p 3.54 for Levi's and M p Ϫ3.11 for Rustler assessed on Ϫ5 to +5 scales for desirability). Similarly, the attribute "preshrunk" was rated as desirable (M p 3.50). These data are described in greater detail in experiment 2 where several product categories were used and the assumption that brand is a general knowledge structure that has implications for several attribute dimensions was validated.
to respond in mood-congruent ways. After participants had indicated their current mood states, they also completed a second measure of affect presented on a separate page. That is, they also reported the extent to which they experienced eight specific emotions (adapted from Penner et al. 1994) while engaging in the earlier affect-inducing activity (watching films): happy, angry, pleasant, sad, delighted, glad, unpleasant, and distressed. Responses to these items, along scales from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely), were also averaged (after reverse scoring those that pertained to negative affect) to provide a single measure of the positive affect that participants recalled experiencing at the time it was induced.
Assessment of Model Parameters
Weight and scale value parameters were computed for each person individually using their responses to the eight stimulus configurations (i.e., information presented alone and in combination). The parameters were estimated using a program known as AVERAGE, developed by Zalinski and Anderson (1990) . This program uses an iterative leastsquares procedure to estimate the absolute weight and scale value associated with each piece of information presented, and also participants' initial impressions (see eq. 2). Thus, for each participant, the program generates an absolute weight and scale value for each level of attribute favorableness, an absolute weight and scale value for each level of brand favorableness, and a single weight and scale value for the initial impression. Estimates of these parameters for each individual participant permit statistical comparisons of parameter estimates over mood conditions. Thus, differences in the parameters can be evaluated using analysis of variance procedures in much the same way as judgment data.
In determining these estimates, the absolute weight assigned to the brand name and attribute was restricted to a range between 0 and 1, whereas the weight of the initial impression was unbounded. Moreover, the scale values were bounded by the end points of the scales along which ratings were made. (Thus, they could range between Ϫ5 and 5.)
The model assumes that the absolute weight and scale value of each piece of information are independent of the amount and type of information presented with it. Moreover, it implies that the effect of any piece of information in isolation is greater than its effect when accompanied by other information (see eq. 2). If these assumptions are correct, the predicted judgments generated by AVERAGE on the basis of absolute weight and scale value parameters for each participant will match the observed judgments for that participant, resulting in a good fit. To evaluate these assumptions, best-fitting model parameters generated by the program were used to compute predicted judgments of the eight stimulus products for each participant separately. A chi-square goodness-of-fit test employed by Zalinski and Anderson (1990) was then used to evaluate the absolute difference between the predicted values of each participant's judgments and the actual values of these judgments. Good fits are indicated by low values of chi-square (which indicate an inability to reject the hypothesis of no difference between Inducing participants to feel happy was expected to increase the influence of brand name on their judgments. According to the averaging model, if this increase is attributable to the influence of positive affect on the weight attached to brand information at the time of judgment, it should be accompanied by a decrease in the influence of attribute information (see eq. 2). If, on the other hand, this increase is attributable to the way in which brand name is interpreted, a decrease in the impact of attribute information should not be evident. Results are more consistent with the second possibility. Data summarized in table 1 indicate that pooled   2 This test is very conservative. If a lower p-value (i.e., a higher chisquare) were used as a basis for rejecting the null hypothesis, the proportion of instances in which the fit of the model was deemed adequate would be even higher.
over the two levels of attribute favorableness, brand had a significantly greater effect when participants were feeling happy (2.89 vs. Ϫ.82, when the brand was favorable vs. unfavorable, respectively; M diff p 3.71) than when they were feeling unhappy (2.36 vs. Ϫ.19, respectively; M diff p 2.55). The different effects in these conditions is confirmed by an interaction of induced affect and brand favorableness, F(1, 42) p 4.10, p ! .05. In contrast, however, the impact of attribute favorableness (pooled over both levels of brand) was no different when participants were happy (1.83 vs. .24; M diff p 1.59) than when they were not (1.78 vs. .39; M diff p 1.39), F ! 1. Thus, although affect increased the impact of brand name on judgments, it did not decrease the influence of other available information, suggesting that the impact of affect on brand name may be through its mediating effect on its interpretation.
Parameter Estimates. Judgment data typically reflect the combined influence of not only the evaluative implications of the information presented but also the weight that is attached to the information and the initial impression (see eq. 2). Therefore, a better indication of the influence of affect on the interpretation and weighting of brand information is obtained from analyses of the parameters pertaining to these characteristics. Analyses of these parameters, which are summarized in table 1, confirm the conclusion based on judgment data. The weight attached to brand information was not appreciably different when participants were happy (M p .68) than when they were unhappy (M p.59), F(1, 42) p 2.28, p 1 .10. Analogous results were obtained when relative weights were analyzed. Therefore, only data and analyses pertaining to absolute weights are reported. The overall effect of induced affect on scale values of brand name was also not significant (M p .85 vs. .05 when participants were happy vs. unhappy, respectively), F(1, 42) p 1.72, p 1 .10, suggesting that there was no significant positivity bias on the interpretation of the brand information. However, the scale values of positive and negative brands were both more extreme when participants were happy (4.19 vs. Ϫ2.49, respectively; M diff p 6.68) than when they were not (1.95 vs. Ϫ1.85, respectively; M diff p 3.80). A signif-icant interaction of induced affect and brand favorableness confirmed this conclusion, F(1, 42) p 5.26, p ! .05.
In contrast to its impact on brand name, affect had no influence at all on either the weight (M p .40 vs. .52 for happy vs. sad participants) or the scale value (M diff p 4.63 vs. 4.01) of the attribute information. No effects involving affect were reliable in analyses of either set of parameters (F ! 1 in all cases).
To summarize, the results of this experiment showed that positive affect had an impact on brand names through its influence on the evaluative implications of brand names rather than the weight attached to it at the time of judgment. This influence is more consistent with the extremity prediction made earlier (Tesser 1978) than with the general positivity bias that was suggested on the basis of affect as information (see Isbell and Wyer 1996) .
EXPERIMENT 2
In experiment 1, the impact of positive affect on the influence of brand information was due largely to its effect on the interpretation of the brand information's evaluative implications rather than on the weight attached to it in the course of computing a judgment. To ensure the generality of this conclusion, the second experiment was modified in several respects. First, judgments of three different products (jeans, sweatshirts, and shoes) were obtained. Second, the information that accompanied brand name consisted of the product's price rather than a specific attribute description. Like brand name, price is an important consideration underlying most product evaluations and purchase decisions. Unlike brand name, however, price is unlikely to be associated with a broad range of attributes and, therefore, is unlikely to be used in top-down processing of the sort assumed to occur when people experience positive affect.
(Support for this assumption will be provided presently.) Third, product evaluations were inferred from not only liking for the products (an affect-based evaluation) but also perceptions of quality, monetary sacrifice, value, and intention to purchase. Although these measures are highly correlated, their inclusion increases the reliability of the measures used. Finally, affect was induced using multiple methods for purposes of generalizability, and the qualifying sentences added in experiment 1 to clarify the implications of brand and attribute favorableness (i.e., those beginning "ranked first . . ." and "Preshrunk jeans . . .") were not provided.
Preliminary Data
Thirty-one students who did not take part in any of the experiments were asked to evaluate various brand names in each of several product categories. Based on these ratings, three categories (jeans, sweatshirts, and running shoes) were selected for which favorable and unfavorable brand names could be identified, and there was relatively low variability in the average prices that participants would pay. The low and high prices selected for use in the experiment were the minimum and maximum prices that participants expected to pay for the product: for jeans, $16 and $45; for sweatshirts, $13 and $44; and for running shoes, $27 and $50. The two brand names selected for each product type, and mean estimates of their favorableness along a scale from Ϫ5 (very undesirable) to +5 (very desirable), were: for jeans, Levi's (M p 3.54) and Rustler (M p Ϫ3.11); for sweatshirts, Champion (M p 4.00) and NuBlends (M p .45); and for shoes, Reebok (M p 3.90) and Trax (M p Ϫ1.26).
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To establish that brand name had implications for a large number of features and price had relatively fewer associations, 95 participants were asked to indicate whether they considered brand name or price to be more informative in evaluating products in each of the three categories under consideration (jeans, sweatshirts, and running shoes). Before responding to this question, however, some participants were asked questions that disposed them to think about brand name, and others were asked questions that disposed them to think about price. Regardless of the nature of this priming, most participants considered brand name more informative than price, and this was true regardless of whether brand was primed (77.4%) or price was primed (76.6%). Participants also indicated the extent to which they could predict workmanship, type of material, style, physical attractiveness, popularity, comfort, and availability from brand name versus price. These ratings, which were reported along seven scales from 0 (could not predict at all) to 10 (could predict very well), indicated that participants perceived these attribute dimensions to be significantly more predictable from brand name (averaged over attributes, M p 6.97) than from price (M p 5.88), F(1, 94) p 36.85, p ! .01. This difference was greater when brand was primed (M p 6.88 vs. 5.36) than when price was primed (7.06 vs. 6.40), F(1, 93) p 6.19, p ! .01, but was evident in both cases.
Method
Design. Ninety-six introductory marketing students were assigned randomly to each cell of a 2 (affect: positive vs. negative) # 2 (induction procedure: watching movies vs. writing about a personal life experience) design. Three additional variables (product type: jeans vs. sweatshirts vs. shoes), brand name (favorable vs. unfavorable) and price (high vs. low) were within-subject factors.
Manipulation of Affect. Affect was induced in two
ways. Half the participants were induced to feel happy or unhappy using the procedure employed in experiment 1. The others were exposed to a procedure used by Schwarz and Clore (1983) . Specifically, participants were asked to 3 Favorable and unfavorable brands may differ somewhat in familiarity. However, supplementary data indicated that for the brands considered in this and other studies, ratings of brand favorableness were correlated only .40 with ratings of familiarity. That is, only 16% of the variance in favorableness was accounted for by this factor. The confound is unlikely to be of sufficient magnitude to create problems in interpreting the results to be reported. collaborate in the development of a life-event inventory that would be used to assess events in people's lives (a story that fit in with the overall cover story of development of student profiles by the university). They were then asked to describe a recent event that "made you feel really happy (unhappy) and continues to make you feel happy (unhappy) whenever you think about it." They were given 20 minutes to complete the task after which they were given the product evaluation task described below and the manipulation check described in experiment 1.
Product Evaluations. The procedure for obtaining product evaluations was the same as in experiment 1 except that three product categories were used and the judgments that participants reported pertained to factors in addition to liking. Each participant evaluated 24 product descriptions (four descriptions based on one piece of information and four descriptions based on two pieces of information for each of the three product categories; see experiment 1). The order in which product categories were presented was counterbalanced using a Latin-square procedure. Further, within each product category, the eight product descriptions based on one and two pieces of information were counterbalanced as separate subgroups. Participants rated products on four scales, ranging from Ϫ5 to +5, that pertained to quality (extremely low vs. extremely high), cost (extremely inexpensive vs. extremely expensive), value (extremely bad buy vs. extremely good buy), and attractiveness (very unattractive vs. very attractive). In addition, they reported how much they would like to purchase the product along a scale from 0 (not at all) to 10 (extremely). This latter scale was recoded (Ϫ5 to +5) at the time of data analysis. The five scales were highly correlated (Cronbach's alpha p .96) and were averaged to provide a single index of evaluation.
Assessment of Model Parameters. The parameterestimation procedure employed in experiment 1 was applied to each individual's data for each of the five scales prior to their being pooled together. Pooled over levels of induced affect, product categories, and judgments, the model fit the data in 79% of the 1,440 cases (five judgments in three product categories for each of the 96 participants), x 2 (7) ! 6.34, p 1 .50. The average chi-square value was 3.88 (SD p 5.328). Thus, the assumptions underlying the model's applicability appear justified (see n. 3).
Results
Manipulation Checks. Participants felt more pleasant at the end of the experiment under positive affect conditions (M p 2.14) than under negative affect conditions (M p Ϫ.70), F(1, 92) p 83.56, p ! .01, and this difference did not depend on the affect-induction technique, F ! 1. They also recalled having more positive feelings at the time the affect was induced in the former case than in the latter (8.69 vs. 3.11, respectively), F(1, 92) p 469.79, p ! .01.
Overall Analyses. Judgment data were generally evaluated in two sets of analyses. First, an analysis of variance was performed on product evaluations, as a function of affect (positive or negative), the induction technique (movies vs. life event inventory), product category, brand favorableness, and price. The last three variables were treated as repeated measures. Parameter estimates were analyzed similarly. The mood-induction technique and product category entered into no meaningful effects in either analyses and will not be discussed further.
Product Judgments. The influence of affect on the impact of brand name is summarized in the bottom half of table 1. These data are consistent with the results of experiment 1. That is, brand name had a greater impact on judgments when participants were experiencing positive affect (M p 2.93 vs. .08 for favorable and unfavorable brands, respectively; M diff p 2.85) than when they were experiencing negative affect (M p 2.50 vs. .20; M diff p 2.30). This difference is confirmed by a significant interaction of brand favorableness and affect, F(1, 92) p 3.95, p ! .05, that was not contingent on either product type or the product's price. In contrast to brand name, however, price (like the attribute information conveyed in experiment 1) had a similar effect regardless of whether participants were experiencing positive affect (M diff p 1.37) or not (M diff p 1.34), F ! 1.
Parameter Estimates. Experiment 1 suggested that influence of induced affect on the impact of brand name was due primarily to its impact on participants' construal of its evaluative implications rather than on the weight that participants attached to it. This was true in the present experiment as well. The overall effect of affect on scale values was negligible (M p .65 vs. .67 for happy and sad participants, respectively), F ! 1. However, the scale value of brand names were more extreme when participants were feeling happy (2.96 vs. Ϫ1.66 for favorable and unfavorable brands; M diff p 4.62) than when they were not (2.64 vs. Ϫ1.30, M diff p 3.94), F(1, 92) p 5.01, p ! .05. On the other hand, affect had no influence on the weight that participants attached to brand name (M p .67 vs. .64, when affect was positive vs. negative, respectively), F(1, 92) p 1.78, p 1 .10.
As expected, however, the scale values of high and low price were not influenced by induced affect (M diff p 2.51 vs. 2.17 for positive and negative affect, respectively), F ! 1. Moreover, although participants attached somewhat more weight to price information when they were experiencing negative affect than when they were experiencing positive affect (.59 vs. .55, respectively), this difference was only marginally significant, F(1, 92) p 3.11, p ! .10.
EXPERIMENT 3
Experiments 1 and 2 showed that positive affect influenced the impact of brand name through its mediating effect on the extremity of its perceived implications rather than on the weight that was attached to it at the time of judgment. This influence was assumed to result from the impact of positive affect on the number of associated features that were identified and elaborated at the time the brand information was received. If this reasoning is correct, however, distracting participants from thinking about brand information at the time they encounter it should decrease their ability to identify the features associated with it regardless of the affect they are experiencing. Consequently, the influence of positive affect on the scale value of this information should be less apparent in this condition.
A comparable influence of distraction on the weight attached to brand name was not expected. If distraction decreases the ability to think carefully about the information available, it might actually increase the use of brand as a heuristic and, therefore, might increase the weight attached to it. However, experiments 1 and 2 suggest that positive affect does not influence the relative weight attached to brand name at the time of judgment. To this extent, any influence of distraction on the relative weights attached to brand name and attribute information should be independent of the affect that participants experience.
To evaluate this possibility, participants in experiment 3 were given brand and attribute information. In some conditions, however, they simultaneously performed an additional task that prevented them from thinking about the information. If positive affect results in greater thinking of the brand's implications, distraction should prevent them from doing so and should decrease the impact of affect on the brand's scale value.
It also seemed reasonable to suppose that the impact of brand name would depend on the amount of information that accompanies it. The nature of this influence was unclear a priori. On one hand, less importance might be given to brand name when a lot of other information accompanies it. On the other hand, brand may be more likely to be used as a heuristic basis for judgments when processing demands are high. Each effect should be reflected in the weight that is attached to brand name at the integration stage of processing. However, the affect that people experience, which presumably has its impact on the interpretation of brand information, was expected to have similar effects on this interpretation independently of the amount of attribute information presented. To assess this, the amount of attribute information was also varied.
Method
Design. Ninety-two undergraduate business students were induced to feel happy or sad by writing about a happy or sad life event. They were then asked to evaluate products from one category (shoes) on the basis of brand name, attribute information, or both. Participants were assigned randomly to cells of a 2 (affect: happy vs. sad) # 2 (amount of information: low vs. high) # 2 (distraction: high vs. low) design, with the brand name and attribute favorableness varying within subjects.
Procedure. The experimenter informed participants that they would take part in two experiments. The first study, which was ostensibly being conducted by a nonprofit organization called the Center for Advanced Studies in Human Relations (CASHR), was used to induce affective reactions. Participants read a letter from the project manager of CASHR that explained that the organization wished to understand how people's interpersonal relationships and personal experiences shaped their long-term personal and professional development. On this pretext, participants were asked to write about a personal experience that made them feel happy (or sad) and continued to make them feel that way when they thought about it. Participants were given 20 minutes to write about this experience.
The second experiment was ostensibly being conducted by a social psychologist at the university. Participants under no-distraction conditions were simply told that the professor was interested in how people are influenced by different amounts and types of information. Under distraction conditions, the instructions went on to indicate that the professor was particularly interested in how people process information that comes in through both the audio and visual channels and that they would be asked to listen to some information on an audiotape while they were performing an unrelated task. To ensure that the participants paid attention to the audiotape, they were told that they would later be asked questions about what was said on the audiotape. Participants were then given the product-evaluation questionnaire. In no-distraction conditions, the questionnaire was completed as in experiments 1 and 2. Under distraction conditions, however, participants while completing the questionnaire listened to the audio description of how China was developing its remote western provinces.
Product Evaluations. The product information provided in this experiment pertained to running shoes. As in experiments 1 and 2, each participant judged eight product descriptions. The first four products were described by either a favorable or unfavorable brand name (Adidas vs. Yasaki) presented alone or a favorable or unfavorable attribute (flexible vs. inflexible sole) presented alone. The next four products were each described by brand name and attribute information in combination. (Mean favorableness ratings for these two brands and two others are reported in experiment 5.) In low-information conditions, the attribute information consisted of the single descriptor. In high-information conditions, however, this descriptor was embedded in a cluster of others that were either evaluatively neutral or relatively unimportant (variable sizes; cushioning and comfort: average; flex groove technology; EVA material; two colors). Participants judged each product description on two Ϫ5 (dislike extremely/extremely bad product) to +5 (like extremely/extremely good product) scales.
After completing the product-judgment task, participants were given the mood manipulation check described in experiment 1 (again disguised as a separate study). In addition, they were given a final questionnaire that assessed how easy they found it to concentrate on the task and how distracted they were by the situation in the lab at the time they were filling out the product-evaluation questionnaire. These rat- .01, and did not significantly depend on the amount of information presented. Data in no-distraction conditions provide an indication of whether the findings replicate and generalize to situations when more information is presented. In these conditions, the scale values of brand were more extreme when participants were happy (pooled over high and low information conditions, M diff p 7.01) than when they were not (M diff p 5.41), F(1, 84) p 2.52, p 1 .10. An examination of the effects of distraction on happy and sad participants separately reveals that distraction significantly decreased the extremity of the scale values that were assigned to brand when participants were happy (M diff p 7.01 vs. 4.53 under no distraction vs. distraction conditions, respectively), F(1, 84) p 6.79, p ! .01. In contrast, the extremity of the scale values that unhappy participants attached to brand was not significantly affected by distraction (M diff p 5.41 vs. 6.64 under no distraction vs. distraction conditions, respectively), F(1, 84) p 1.68, p 1 .10. Thus, the data converge on the conclusion that distraction decreased the extent to which happy participants elaborated on the implications of the brand and, therefore, decreased the extremity of the evaluative implications they perceived this information to have. However, unhappy participants, who did not think extensively about brand information even in the absence of distraction, were unaffected by it.
Experimental manipulations had relatively little influence on the weight attached to brand name. Participants tended to place less weight on brand name when they were feeling happy (M p .64) than when they were not (M p .73). However, neither this nor any other effects involving mood and weights were significant, in all cases, F(1, 84) ! 2.84, p 1 .10.
Two aspects of these findings deserve comment. First, the failure of distraction to influence the weight attached to brand name might seem counter to evidence that positive affect increases the use of brand name as a heuristic. However, this increase might only occur when a large amount of information is presented. Although the amount of attribute information presented in this study was varied, the manipulation may not have been strong enough to influence the use of brand as a heuristic. Second, distraction appeared not only to eliminate the impact of affect on the interpretation of brand information but to reverse it. That is, distracted participants assigned more extreme scale values to brand name when they were unhappy than when they were happy (see table 2 ). This reversal would be consistent with suggestions that persons who experience negative affect engage in analytical processing (Schwarz and Bless 1991) and that this effect overrides the influence of positive affect on use of general knowledge structures evident in the absence of distraction. Perhaps differences in analytical processing occur only when cognitive demands are high.
EXPERIMENT 4
Experiments 1-3 converge on the conclusion that positive affect leads people to perceive brand names as having more extreme evaluative implications without necessarily influencing the weight they attach to it at the time of judgment. However, the absence of any effects on weighting was inferred on the basis of parameter-estimation procedures that independently assess the weights and scale values assigned to the different pieces of information presented. It seemed desirable to obtain converging support for the absence of these weighting effects using different criteria.
The influence of affect on the weighting of information in the present study was inferred using recognition memory procedures. Happy and unhappy participants formed impressions of four products, each described by a different (favorable or unfavorable) brand and (favorable or unfavorable) attribute. After doing so, they were asked to indicate how much they would pay for each of the four products described-a task that presumably required them to integrate the information given for each product (Dodds, Monroe, and Grewal 1991) . They were then given a recognition memory test containing both brand names and attributes, some of which were contained in the product descriptions and others of which were not. The time to verify each recognition item was recorded. If happy participants give brand name greater consideration than unhappy participants at the time they make a judgment, they should later be able to recognize these names more quickly and easily than unhappy participants.
Method
Product-Evaluation Task. Forty introductory marketing students were first induced to feel happy or sad by having them write about either a pleasant or an unpleasant personal experience (see experiment 2). Then, they performed a product-evaluation task in which they received information about four different products. Each product was of a different type (jeans, sweatshirts, running shoes, or backpacks), and was described by a favorable or unfavorable brand name and a favorable or unfavorable attribute. (This was done in a Latinsquare design so that each product considered by a given participant was described by a different combination of brand favorableness and attribute favorableness. Therefore, when pooled over participants in each affect-induction condition, each combination of brand and attribute favorableness was associated with each product type the same number of times.)
The brand names and attributes that composed the aforementioned product descriptions were taken from materials used by Adaval (2001) . The favorable and unfavorable brand names in four product categories were: for jeans, Levi's and Rustler, respectively; for sweatshirts, Champion and NuBlends, respectively; for shoes, Reebok and Trax, respectively; and for backpacks, Jansport and Strike Force, respectively. Attribute information for the four product categories were: for jeans, preshrunk versus not; for sweatshirts, 80% cotton/20% polyester versus 80% polyester/20% cotton; for shoes, feel soft and have high flexibility versus feel hard and have low flexibility; and for backpacks, five pockets versus one pocket.
Recognition Task. Participants were asked to form an impression of each of the products described and to indicate how much money they would pay for a product of this sort (i.e., indicate a dollar amount). Then after performing a fiveminute unrelated task to clear short-term memory, participants were told that their evaluations of products are often better understood by determining their memory of the product information shown. They were told that they would be shown different pieces of information on a computer screen and were asked to press one of two specified keys to indicate whether the information was or was not used to describe one of the four products they had considered earlier.
Two lists of recognition items were constructed, each of which was administered to half the subjects in each experimental condition. Each list consisted of three warm-up stimuli and 32 test stimuli. The test stimuli in each list were constructed from the 16 brand and attribute descriptions used in preparing stimulus materials (i.e., two brands and two attribute descriptions in each of the four product categories), eight of which participants had actually seen and eight of which they had not. These 16 stimuli were presented twice in counterbalanced order so that the mean serial po-sition of each stimulus item was the same. On completion of the response time task, participants were given the mood manipulation check questionnaire identical to the one presented in experiments 1 and 2 and then debriefed.
Results
Manipulation Checks. Participants reported feeling happier at the end of the experiment if they had written about a positive life experience (M p 2.54) than if they had written about a negative one (M p Ϫ1.04), F(1, 39) p 3.76, p ! .06. In addition, they recalled experiencing more positive emotions when they wrote about a happy life event (M p 7.62) than when they wrote about an unhappy one (M p 3.24), F(1, 38) p 48.07, p ! .01.
Recognition Accuracy. Participants were 90% accurate in identifying presented items about brands and 92% accurate in responding to presented items about attributes. Their accuracy in responding to nonpresented items about brands and attributes was comparable (94% in each case). These proportions did not vary significantly over experimental conditions (F ! 1 in all cases). Therefore, any differences in response times were unlikely to be due to uncertainty about whether they were actually presented.
Response Times. If positive affect increases the consideration given to a brand name at the time participants estimated the prices they would pay, it should increase the accessibility of this information in memory and, therefore, should increase the speed with which participants can later identify the brand names as having been contained in the product description they had encountered earlier. To investigate this possibility, participants' response times to both presented brand names and distracters were averaged over the two presentations of each stimulus and evaluated as a function of induced mood, brand name favorableness, and item type (presented vs. not presented) . Participants responded more quickly to brands that had actually been presented than to distracters (M p .820 sec vs. .916 sec), F(1, 38) p 14.68, p ! .01. However, their response times were very similar when they were feeling happy and when they were not (M p .871 sec vs. .854 sec), and this was true for both presented brand names (M p .829 sec vs. .812 sec) and distracters (M p .925 sec vs. .898 sec). Thus, there was no evidence that positive affect had a general influence on the consideration that participants gave to brand information when they thought about how much the product was worth. Corresponding analyses were performed on responses to attribute descriptions. Participants responded more quickly to attribute descriptions if the descriptions had actually been presented than if they had not (M p 1.085 sec vs. M p 1.164 sec), F(1, 38) p 8.45, p ! .01. However, no effects of induced affect on responses to attribute favorableness even approached significance, F ! 1.
This does not mean that affect had no impact at all on responses to brand information. However, its influence did not depend on the valence of the brand name per se. Rather, it depended on whether the affect that participants were experiencing was congruent versus incongruent in valence with the favorableness of the brand they were considering. Specifically, participants recognized presented brands more quickly if the brands were congruent with the feelings they were experiencing than if they were incongruent (M p .796 sec vs. .889 sec). These differences are confirmed by a threeway interaction of induced mood, brand favorableness, and item type F(1, 38) p 4.72, p ! .05. These effects are consistent with other evidence that people pay more attention to mood-congruent information than to mood-incongruent information (Adaval 2001; Forgas and Bower 1987) and suggest that these effects on weighting could be localized at the information-integration stage. However, the impact of affect per se on the influence of brand name appears to be localized at the time of encoding.
EXPERIMENT 5
Experiments 1-4 converge on the conclusion that the influence of positive affect on the impact of brand information lies in its impact on perceptions of the evaluative implications of this information at the time of input. Affect does not appear to influence the weight that participants attach to brand name in the course of computing a judgment. One implication of this conclusion is that once positive affect influences the way in which a brand is interpreted (i.e., more extremely), this encoding may persist to influence judgments in other contexts (Srull and Wyer 1980) . Experiment 5 evaluated this possibility.
The rationale for the study is as follows. Suppose participants who experience positive affect encounter a product that is described by brand name alone. They should evaluate it more favorably if it is described by a moderately favorable brand name and less favorably if it is described by a moderately unfavorable brand name than they would otherwise. Suppose further that, after the affect they have been experiencing has dissipated, participants are asked to choose between this product and a new one whose brand name is objectively similar in favorableness. To make this choice, they presumably compute their evaluation of the new product and compare it to their previously formed evaluation of the first product. If the first product's brand name is moderately favorable (and had been interpreted as even more favorable as a result of the positive affect they were experiencing at the time they first considered it), participants should prefer this product to the new one. However, if the first product's brand name is moderately unfavorable (and had been evaluated more unfavorably as a result of the positive affect they were experiencing earlier), they should prefer the new product instead. These differences in preference should be less evident when participants had experienced negative affect at the time they considered the first product. Finally, if there is a general tendency to evaluate products more favorably when participants are happy, this positivity bias should lead both favorable and unfavorable brands presented earlier to be preferred over the new one.
Method
Fifty introductory marketing students participated for course credit in two experimental sessions. Instructions were similar to those given in experiment 2. That is, in session 1, participants were induced to feel either happy or sad by writing about a pleasant or unpleasant personal experience. Then, they were told that they would participate in a different study on how consumers make judgments and decisions about products and would be asked to evaluate a product on the basis of the information provided. Under this pretext, they were shown a picture of a pair of shoes along with the logo and a brief attribute description. In addition, the shoes were assigned either a favorable brand name (either Adidas or Converse) or an unfavorable one (either Yasaki or LA Gear). Pretests revealed that the first two brands were viewed as equally favorable (2.89 vs. 2.88) and the second two were viewed as equally unfavorable (Ϫ1.92 vs. Ϫ1.00). Participants reported their impression of the brand along a scale from Ϫ5 (extremely unfavorable) to +5 (extremely favorable), completed a mood manipulation check similar to that used in other studies, and were dismissed with instructions to return the following day.
When participants returned, they were told that the researcher was interested in how a new product compared to the one they had seen earlier. A second brand that was similar to the first in favorableness but was described by a different brand name and attribute description was then presented. Specifically, participants who had evaluated Adidas in the first session evaluated Converse in the second, and vice versa. Similarly, participants who evaluated Yasaki in the first session evaluated LA Gear in the second, and vice versa. The attribute descriptions that accompanied the two pairs of shoes differed slightly in order to make them somewhat realistic. Thus, one shoe was described as a "sports shoe with nylon mesh and nubuck upper; Rubber outsole" and the other was described as a "sports shoe with polyester and suede trim; Rubber outsole." Participants were asked to choose which shoe they preferred. Finally, they reported their current mood using a measure similar to that employed in session 1.
Results
Manipulation Checks. Participants reported feeling relatively happier at the end of the first experimental session if they had written about a happy life experience rather than a sad one (M p 1.02 vs. Ϫ.37), F(1, 47) p 5.97, p ! .05. However, the feelings reported by these participants in session 2 did not differ (M p .80 vs. .48), F ! 1. Thus, any influence of affect on the use of brand name in session 2 was due to the feelings induced in session 1. Participants also recalled experiencing more positive feelings when writing about a happy life experience than a sad one (M p 7.21 vs. 3.04), F(1, 47) p 108.04, p ! .01.
Judgment Data, Session 1. Participants' product evaluations in session 1 were more extreme when they were feeling good (2.46 vs. Ϫ2.09 for favorable vs. unfavorable brands, respectively) than when they were not (1.36 vs. Ϫ1.08). Although the interaction of mood and brand favorableness implied by these differences was only marginally significant, F(1, 41) p 3.11, p ! .10, it is quite consistent with the results of previous experiments.
Product Choices, Session 2. To reiterate, the influence of positive affect on the interpretation of brand information presumably occurs at the time this information is received. The implications of this interpretation are presumably stored in memory and can be recalled and used when comparing the product to a new one that participants encounter later. If this is so, participants who experience positive affect at the time they receive information about the first product should prefer this product to the second one if the products being compared have moderately favorable brand names. However, they should prefer the second product to the first one if the products have moderately unfavorable brand names. These differences should not be evident, however, for participants who experience negative affect.
Results are consistent with these expectations. When moderately favorable brand names were compared, a greater proportion of participants were likely to prefer the first product if they had experienced positive affect at the time they received information about this product (.73) than if they had experienced negative affect (.23). The difference between these proportions was significant, z p 2.85, p ! .01. When the brands were unfavorable, however, participants were less likely to choose the first product over the second if they had experienced positive affect at the time the first product was described (.00) than if they had experienced negative affect (.36), z p 3.27, p ! .01. The interaction of affect and brand favorableness was confirmed in an analysis of variance of dichotomous data, F(1, 46) p 13.49, p ! .001.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
The present studies are among the first to investigate how brand name and affect combine to influence product judgments and the processes that underlie this influence. In doing so, they identify an effect that has not previously been uncovered in research on either consumer judgment or on affect. In principle, affect could influence the interpretation of brand information at the time it is received and/or the weight that is given to this information at the time of judgment. The present research shows that the affective reactions that people experience have their primary influence on the perceptions of the brand's evaluative implications rather than the weight that is attached to it. That is, people who feel happy at the time they receive information perceive the brand name to have more extreme evaluative implications rather than generally more favorable ones. This influence differs from that identified by previous research on how affect influences the interpretation of information (Bower 1981; Forgas, Bower, and Krantz 1984; Isbell and Wyer 1996) .
The explanation of this effect assumes that brands are general knowledge structures that are associated in memory with a large number of features and experiences that are relatively similar in favorableness and that our assessment of a brand's favorableness is based on a mental review of these associations. The experience of positive affect induces people to attend to general knowledge structures and increases the number of its associated features that are thought about. As a result, the perceived implications of brand name become more extreme for reasons similar to those that more generally underlie the increased polarization of judgments following thought (Tesser 1978; Tesser and Leone 1977) .
At the same time, the results call into question other possible influences that affective reactions might have on the processing of brand information. For example, brand name has sometimes been viewed as a heuristic basis for judgment that people use when they are unmotivated or unable to think extensively about the information they receive (Maheswaran et al. 1992) . One might expect this tendency to be more pronounced when people are feeling happy than when they are not (cf. Bodenhausen et al. 1994) . If this were the case in the present research, this tendency should have been reflected in the weight that happy participants attached to brand information at the time of judgment. In fact, affect had little if any impact on the weight given to brand information in the studies we reported. In most of the experiments conducted in this research, only two pieces of information (brand name and a specific attribute) were presented. In these conditions, the difference in weighting of the two types of information might have been too small to be detected. However, positive affect also failed to influence the weight attached to brand name in experiment 3 in which the amount of attribute information was increased and participants were distracted. Thus, the null effects on weighting obtained in the other experiments seem unlikely to be artifactual.
The various influences of affect on product evaluations noted above are obviously difficult to tease apart. The approach taken in the present research, however, permits some of these influences to be disentangled by obtaining separate estimates of weight and scale value parameters. The utility of this approach obviously depends on the applicability of the information integration process used to derive these parameters. As Wyer and Carlston (1979) point out, this applicability may be constrained to certain situations (but see Wyer et al. 1999 for a discussion of how the model might be more relevant to product judgments as opposed to judgments of persons). In the present studies, the model provided a very good fit to the data. However, caution should be taken in overgeneralizing its use to other stimulus domains and information-presentation procedures (for other integration processes, see Fishbein and Ajzen 1975; Fiske and Pavelchak 1986) .
The polarization of brand perceptions under positive affect conditions should be considered in the context of research on construct accessibility (cf. Higgins 1996) . Herr (1986) found that people interpret information in terms of semantic concepts that are easily accessible in memory if these concepts are applicable but use these concepts as standards of comparison in interpreting information if the concepts are inapplicable. If positive affect makes favorable concepts more accessible in memory, these concepts might be used to construe the evaluative implications of favorable brands, making them seem even more favorable. The concepts would, however, be inapplicable in interpreting unfavorable brands, leading the brands to be contrasted and, therefore, judged more unfavorably. However, Niedenthal and Setterlund (1994) found that positive affect does not make positive concepts more accessible in memory. Therefore, this explanation does not seem viable.
An alternative possibility is that the feelings people experience may themselves be used as a basis for judgment Clore 1983, 1996) . Thus, people who experience positive affect perceive it to be applicable for construing the evaluative implications of a favorable brand, leading them to evaluate the brand more favorably than they otherwise would. However, they may perceive their positive feelings to be inapplicable for judging an unfavorable brand. In the latter case, two possibilities arise. First, people might simply discount the affect they are experiencing and base their evaluation on other criteria. In this case, affect should have little effect on evaluations of the unfavorable brand, contrary to the effects observed in the studies reported here. Second, participants may use the feelings they are experiencing as a standard of comparison in evaluating the unfavorable brand, leading it to be judged less favorably than it would otherwise. If this were true, analogous assimilation and contrast effects should occur when people experience negative affect. The results do not support this possibility either. Rather, they are more consistent with the proposed conceptualization that suggests that the impact of negative affect should not be appreciably different from that of neutral affect. Although a neutral affect condition was not run, this implication of the theory may be worth exploring.
Other possible explanations involving response language effects may at first glance seem plausible. Such hypotheses assume that people who are called upon to evaluate a stimulus construct a perspective for judging it. This perspective includes the range of stimulus values they consider to be potentially relevant. The rating scale they use to report judgments is subjectively positioned in relation to this perspective (Adaval and Monroe 2002; Ostrom and Upshaw 1968) . In the present context, this could have two effects. First, individuals may adopt a perspective that includes more positive values when they are experiencing positive affect than when they are not (i.e., they shift their response scale up). To this extent, however, happy persons should evaluate all brands less favorably than unhappy persons do. Although this could account for participants' tendency to judge unfavorable brands relatively more unfavorably when they are happy than when they are not, it also implies that they should evaluate favorable brands less favorably in the former case. In fact, the opposite was true. A related possibility is suggested by evidence that people who experience positive affect use broader categories to interpret information (Isen 1987) . Happy persons might include a wider range of values in the perspective they bring to bear on their judgments and, therefore, the range they consider in positioning their scale for reporting these judgments. If this were true, however, happy persons should evaluate stimuli less extremely along the dimension of judgment rather than more extremely.
One of the more important implications of the results concerns the persistence of the effects of affect on brand perceptions over time and situations. That is, the affect that people happen to be experiencing at the time they receive product information is often transitory, resulting from extraneous situational factors that exist at the time. However, the change in evaluative implications of brand name that results from this affect may be stored in memory and recalled later for use as a basis for judgments even though the affect that initially influenced its interpretation is no longer being experienced. Experiment 5 showed that the influence of positive affect on the interpretation of brand name information in an initial session influenced comparative judgments 24 hours later. Some caution should be taken in interpreting this result. That is, participants might have recalled and used the rating of the product they had made in the first session as a basis for judgments rather than recalling the evaluative implications of brand name per se. However, in light of the evidence from other experiments, it seems reasonable to assume that the changes in scale values at the early stages of information processing were responsible for these long-lasting effects.
The research reported has important implications for understanding how affect (from both relevant and irrelevant sources) might interact with prior knowledge that is accessed when a brand is encountered. In the studies reported, the affect manipulated was extraneous. In many instances, however, experiences with the brand itself might elicit positive affect and might trigger the retrieval of prior experiences or associations. The possibility that these elaborations increase the polarization of brand evaluations and have an impact on later judgments and choice is interesting and merits further investigation. The changes in scale value that result from the experience of positive affect suggest that there may be a tendency to review associated features automatically in these conditions. Further research that attempts to identify if this is indeed the case would have far reaching implications on how affect may influence a brand's equity.
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